We consider the General Gaussian Multiple Access Wire-Tap Channel (GGMAC-WT). In this scenario, multiple users communicate with an intended receiver in the presence of an intelligent and informed eavesdropper. We define two suitable secrecy measures, termed individual and collective, to reflect the confidence in the system for this multi-access environment. We determine achievable rates such that secrecy to some predetermined degree can be maintained, using Gaussian codebooks. We also find outer bounds for the case when the eavesdropper receives a degraded version of the intended receiver's signal. In the degraded case, Gaussian codewords are shown to achieve the sum capacity for collective constraints. In addition, a TDMA scheme is shown to also achieve sum capacity for both sets of constraints. Numerical results showing the new rate region are presented and compared with the capacity region of the Gaussian Multiple-Access Channel (GMAC) with no secrecy constraints. We then find the secrecy sum-rate maximizing power allocations for the transmitters, and show that a cooperative jamming scheme can be used to increase achievable rates in this scenario.
their messages secret from each other while communicating with a common receiver. In [22] , an achievable region is found in general, and the capacity region is found for some special cases.
In this paper, we consider the General Gaussian Multiple Access Wire-Tap Channel (GGMAC-WT), and present our results to date under the fairly general model of a wireless channel through which each user transmits open and confidential messages. We consider two separate secrecy constraints, which we call the individual and collective secrecy constraints, to reflect the differing amounts of confidence that users can place on the network, as defined in [24] . These two different sets of security constraints are (i) the normalized entropy of any set of messages conditioned on the transmitted codewords of the other users and the received signal at the wire-tapper, and (ii) the normalized entropy of any set of messages conditioned on the wire-tapper's received signal. Individual constraints are more conservative to ensure secrecy of any group of users even when the remaining users are compromised. Collective constraints, on the other hand, rely on the secrecy of all users, and as such enable an increase in the achievable secrecy rates. In [24] , we considered perfect secrecy for both constraints for the degraded wire-tapper case. In [25] , [26] , we examined the achievable rates when we relaxed our secrecy constraints so that a certain amount 0 < d < 1 of the total information was to be kept secret for the degraded case. We also found outer bounds for the secrecy rates, and showed using collective secrecy constraints, the Gaussian codebooks achieve sum capacity. In addition TDMA was shown to be optimal for both constraints and achieve sum-capacity. In [27] , we considered the General (non-degraded) GMAC and found an achievable secrecy/rate region. In this case, we were also presented with a sum-rate maximization problem, as the maximum achievable rate depends on the transmit powers. We noted that users may trade secrecy rates such that even "bad" users may achieve positive secret rates at the behalf of the "good" users. In addition, we found the sum-rate maximizing power allocations. We also introduced the notion of a subset of users jamming the eavesdropper to help increase the secrecy sum-rate. This notion, which we term cooperative jamming, is considered in detail in this paper.
II. MAIN RESULTS
Our main contributions in this area are listed below, 1) We define two sets of information theoretic secrecy measures for a multiple-access channel: l Individual: Secrecy is maintained for any user even if the remaining users are compromised. l Collective: Secrecy is achieved with the assumption that all users are secure. 2) Using Gaussian codebooks, we find achievable regions for both sets of constraints. These rates may be strengthened as in [6] to get strong secret key rates. 3) For the degraded case, we find outer bounds for both sets of constraints and show that the sum capacity bound is the same for both sets of constraints.
. For individual constraints, the achievable region is a subset of the outer bounds, but using TDMA it is possible to achieve the sum capacity. . For collective constraints, it is shown that Gaussian codebooks achieve the sum capacity. These outer bounds are "strong" in the sense of [6] , and hence we determine the strong secrecy key sumcapacities when the eavesdropper is degraded. 4) When the transmitters only have secret messages to send, we determine the power allocations that maximize the secrecy sum-rate. 5) We show that a scheme where users cooperate, with "bad" users helping "better" users by jamming the eavesdropper, may achieve higher secrecy rates or allow the "better" user to achieve a positive secrecy capacity. We term this scheme cooperative jamming. the intended receiver and the wire-tapper each get a copy Y yn and Z = Zn. The receiver decodes Y to get an estimate of the transmitted messages, W. We would like to communicate with the receiver with arbitrarily low probability of error, while maintaining perfect secrecy for the secret messages given a set of secrecy constraints to be defined shortly. By intelligent and informed eavesdropper, we mean that the channel parameters are universally known, including at the eavesdropper, and that the eavesdropper also has knowledge of the codebooks and coding scheme known. The signals at the intended receiver and the wiretapper are given by Y = 1VlhXk +NM Z = EK Xk+NW (1) (2) where NM, NI are the AWGN. Each component of NM AJ (0, o72) and NIW;, AJ (0, o72). We also assume the following 
We examine the GGMAC-WT by an equivalent standard form, as in [26]: Y = E=1lXk + NM (4) Z Ek=lhkXk +NW (5) where hk 2) Collective Constraints: The individual constraints (7) are a conservative measure as they reflect the case where users do not trust the secrecy of other users. We next define a revised secrecy measure to take into account the multi-access nature of the channel, where there is more trust in the system, and users can count on this to achieve higher secrecy rates:
which is the normalized equivocation of all the secret messages in the system. Similar to the individual constraints case, consider this measure for an arbitrary subset S of users: (1 h)I). In practical situations, we think of this as the eavesdropper being able to wire-tap receiver rather than receive the signals itself.
A. Secrecy Measures
We aim to provide each group of users with a f determined amount of secrecy. Letting As be our secr constraint for any subset S of users, we require that As3 for all sets S C IC. To that end, in [24], we used an appro similar to [2] , [4] , and defined two sets of secrecy constrai using the normalized equivocations. These are: 1) Individual Constraints: Define Al H(WklXk,Z) Vk = 1,...,K
k H (Wks) where kc is the set of all users except user k. If H(Wks) = 0, we define Al = 1. Al denotes the normalized entropy of a user's message given the received signal at the wire-tapper as well as all other users' transmitted symbols. This 
where C A H(W )6 > 0 as e -> 0. If H(W') = 0, then we define As = 1. Thus, the perfect secrecy of the system implies the perfect secrecy of any group of users. Hence, we only impose the system secrecy constraint in (14) . Note that in the previous section, we showed that if A' > 1 -e for all k, then A' = A' > 1 -, which is why the collective constraint is strictly weaker than the individual constraint.
B. Preliminary Definitions
Definition 
A' > 1 -, Vk C I, if using individual constraints (23) Ac > 1 -, if using collective constraints (24)
We will call the set of all achievable rates C' for individual constraints, and Cc for collective constraints.
Definition 2 (Achievable rates with 6-secrecy). We say that R6 = (R6,... RK) is 6-achievable if a rate R is achievable such that R6 = RS + R' and Rk > 6, Vk C IC. Since the whole message for a user, Wk is uniformly distributed in Wk, this is equivalent to stating that at least a portion 0 < d < 1 of the message is secret for each user. When d = 1, then all users want to maintain perfect secrecy, i.e., there is no open message. When d = 0, then the system is a standard MAC with no secret messages. Before we state our results, we also define the following:
where it should be noted that CM,Cw and (w are functions of the transmit powers, even when it is not made explicit in the text to simplify notation.
IV. ACHIEVABLE SECRECY RATE REGIONS In this section, we find a set of achievable rates using Gaussian codebooks and simultaneous superposition coding as described in Appendix I-A, which we call g' for individual constraints, and QC for collective constraints. We also find a region achievable using TDMA, and is valid for both sets of constraints. This region, which we call g', is a subset of the achievable region when using collective constraints, but enlarges the achievable region when using individual constraints. We should also note that these rates can be strengthened using extractor functions as shown in [6] , for details see [28] .
A. Individual Secrecy
In [4] , it has been shown that Gaussian codebooks can be used to maintain secrecy for a single user wire-tap channel. Using a similar approach, we show that an achievable region using individual constraints is given by: 
C. Time-Division Multiple-Access
We can also use TDMA to get an achievable region.
Consider this scheme: Let ak C [0,1], k = 1,... , K and K1 k 1. User k only transmits ak of the time with power Pk/ak, hence satisfying the average power constraints.
The transmission uses the scheme described in [4] . Since only one user is transmitting at a given time, both sets of constraints collapse down to a set of single-user secrecy constraints, for which the results were given in [4] :
Q'(PR) 
Then, the region 96 convex closure of U U Qa(P, a) (40)
For collective secrecy constraints, gT is a subset of QC For individual secrecy constraints, however, this region is sometimes a superset of g', and sometimes a subset of g', but most of the time it helps enlarge this region. We can then, using time-sharing arguments, find a new achievable region for individual constraints that is the convex-closure of the union of the two regions, i.e., Proposition 4. The following region is achievable for individual secrecy constraints: 9I = convex closure of (9' U gT)
In this section, we present outer bounds on the sets of achievable secrecy rates for the degraded case. We find the secrecy sum-capacity which is equal for both sets of constraints, and show the region given in Theorem 2 achieves this capacity, as does the TDMA region given in Theorem 3.
A. Individual Secrecy
Theorem 5. For the GMAC-WT, given the set of transmit powers P, the achievable rates for individual constraints belong to the region 
Proof: See Appendix II-A.
B. Collective Secrecy
Our main result is presented in the following theorem: Theorem 6. For the GMAC-WT with collective secrecy constraints, given the transmit power P, the secure rate-tuples must be in the region For the degraded case, we can find the secrecy sumcapacities for both sets of constraints. Incidentally, the secrecy sum-capacity is the same, and is stated below: Theolrem 7. For the degraded case, the secrecy sum capacity is given by
The converses proven in this section for the degraded case are strong converses in the sense of [6] . Strengthening the achievable rates as shown in the same paper thus establishes the strong secret key sum-capacity for the degraded case.
VI. MAXIMIZATION OF SUM RATE FOR COLLECTIVE CONSTRAINTS & COOPERATIVE JAMMING
Clearly, the collective secrecy constraints are more interesting in the sense that they utilize the multi-access nature of the channel. When we impose individual constraints, each user has to fend for itself, confusing the eavesdropper without depending on the other users. However, this only allows "good" users to be able to communicate. Collective constraints, on the other hand, allow users to help each other, and achieve a larger rate region. Thus, in this section we concentrate on collective constraints.
The achievable region given in Theorem 2 depends on the transmit powers. We are naturally interested in the power allocation P* = (P1*, . . ., Pk,) that would maximize the total secrecy sum-rate. For ease of illustration, we consider the K = 2 user case, and assume h, < h2. In other words, user l's channel is "better" than user 2's channel since a lower channel gain means less information leaks to the eavesdropper.
A. Sum-Rate Maximization
We would like to find the power allocation that will maximize the secrecy sum-rate achievable found in Theorem 2. 
B. Cooperative Jamming
The solution to the optimization problem given in Theorem 8 shows that when h2> 1+ P, which implies g h P) > g ( P4 ) for all P2 > 0, then user 2 should not transmit as it cannot achieve secrecy. However, such a user k has high eavesdropper channel gain, hk, and if it started "jamming" the channel, then it would harm the eavesdropper more than it would the intended receiver. Since the secrecy capacity for the remaining single user is the difference of the channel capacities, it might be possible to increase user 1's capacity, or even, when h, > 1 allow it to start transmitting. The jamming is done simply by transmitting white Gaussian noise, i.e., X2 \V (0, P2I). As shown in [28] , it is always better for "bad" users to jam. The problem is finding the power allocations that will maximize the secrecy capacity for user 1, formally stated as: 
VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present numerical results to illustrate the achievable rates and our cooperative jamming scheme. To see how the channel parameters and the required level of secrecy affect the achievable rates, we consider the two-user degraded case as illustrated in Figures 2,3 . We observe that if the wiretapper's degradedness is severe (h -> 0), then the secrecy sum-capacity goes to g(Pvc), i.e., we incur no loss in sum capacity and can still communicate with perfect secrecy as the sum capacity is achievable for both sets of constraints. On the other hand, if the wire-tapper is not severely degraded, (h -> 1), then the secrecy sum-capacity becomes zero. Another point to note is that the 6-achievable sum-secrecy capacity is limited by 1 log (4+Pc ), and this term is an increasing function of P,c. However, as P,c -> oc, it is upper bounded by -1 log h. We see that regardless of the available power, the sum capacity with a non-zero level of secrecy is limited by the degradedness, h, and the level of secrecy required, 6.
We also show the results of a scenario with a mobile eavesdropper (in general non-degraded) and a static base station in a 100 x 100 grid. We use a simple path loss model, and show the optimum transmit/jamming powers when the eavesdropper is at (x, y) in Figure 4(a) , and the resulting sumrates achieved with and without cooperative jamming in Figure  4 to the base station, but higher rates are achieved with less power when the eavesdropper is closer to the jammer. Also, the area near the BS where secrecy sum-rate is zero without cooperative jamming is reduced.
VIII. CONCLUSION In this paper, we considered the GMAC in the presence of an external eavesdropper from which information is to be kept secret. We have established achievable rates, and outer bounds on secrecy capacity for certain scenarios. We have shown that the multiple-access nature of the channel can be utilized to improve the secrecy of the system. Allowing confidence in the secrecy of all users, the secrecy rate of a user is improved since the undecoded messages of any set of users acts as additional noise at the wire-tapper and precludes it from decoding the remaining set of users. We have also found the sum-rate maximizing power allocations, and show a novel scheme, which we call cooperative jamming, which can be utilized to increase the achievable sum-rate. We note the cooperative achievements that are possible for the GGMAC-WT with collective secrecy: (i) "good" users may sacrifice their rates so that some "bad" users can achieve positive secrecy rates, and (ii) really "bad" users may sacrifice power to help the actual transmitters by jamming the eavesdropper.
APPENDIX I ACHIEVABLE RATES A. Superposition Encoding Scheme
For each user k C K:, consider the scheme: 
C. Collective Constraints
The proof is similar to the proof for individual constraints. Let P C P and R satisfy (33) and assume the coding scheme is as given in Appendix I-A. We choose the rates such that which, when simplified, gives (37). We can use time-sharing between different scheduling schemes to achieve the convex closure of the union over all oa and power allocations. The corollary follows from Definition 2. (66) where we used W -> XE -> Z X H(ZIWs,Xz) H(Z XE) to get (66). We will consider the two mutual information terms individually. First, we have the trivial bound due to channel capacity: I(Xy; Z) < nrC. We write the second out as I(Xz; ZWs) =H(XE Ws)-H(XE Ws, Z).
Since user k sends one of M M[ codewords for each message, H(XEzWs) = n 1 (R' + R') = nC/ from (61).
We can also write H(XEy Ws, Z) < n6, where 6, -> 0 as n --> oo since, the eavesdropper can decode XE given Ws due to (61) and code construction. Using these in (66), we get 1 APPENDIX II OUTER BOUNDS
We first adapt [4, Lemma 10] to upper bound the difference between the received signal entropies at the receiver and eavesdropper, when the eavesdropper's signal is degraded: Lemma 10 (Lemma 10 in1 [4] ). Let ( Y, Z are as given in (6) In the TDMA scheme described in Theorem 3, only one user transmits at a time. Hence, H(W, Xk -,: Z) = H(W, Z) as at any given time the codewords of the remaining users do not provide any information to the eavesdropper about the transmitting user's message. As a result, both sets of secrecy constraints become equivalent. Since this is a collection of single-user schemes, using the achievability proof in [4] , and noting that the degradedness condition is only used for proving the converse, we can, for each user, achieve H(YIXs) < n log (27e(1 + Ps,)) -2 (75) Let H(Y 1Xs) = n1. Then, ( < 2 log (27we(1 + Ps,)), and since 0(() is a non-increasing function of (, we get 0(() > (' log (27e(1 + Ps,))). Since {Xk} are independent, we can use the lemma with Y -> Y Xs and Z -> Z Xs, 
We also present the following lemma that is valid for the general (non-degraded) case: 
F-

A. Individual Constraints
The proof is a simple extension of the proof of Lemma 7 in [4] , but stronger in the sense of [6] as we prove an outer bound satisfying H(Wks Xkl, Z) > H(W) -E, for all k C IC. Clearly, any set of rates satisfying the original individual constraints also satisfies these constraints. We begin with: where ,j (P) = 1+pl(Pj2. It is easy to see that if hi > p(P*), then ,lj > 0, and we have Pj* =Pj. If hj <p(P*), then we similarly find that P* = 0. Finally, if hj = p(P*), we can have 0 < P* < Pj. However, then ,j (P*) = 0, so we can set Pj* = 0 with no effect on the secrecy sum-rate. Thus, we have Pi* = Pj if hj < p(P*), and Pj* = 0 if hj > p(P*). Assume h2 > h, > 1. In this case, w p > 0. If P1* = 0, then we must have P secrecy rate is 0. If hi = h2, then regardless 02(P, P2*) = 0 and jamming does not affect and we have P2* = O => P1* = 0. Assume h2 like to find when we can have P1* > 0. Sin( we must have P2* > > 0, and 02Q(I implies p < P2 < p. It is easy to see that I if hi-1 < min {p, P2} and P2 = 0 otherw [12] , "Secrecy capacities for multiple terminals," IEEE Trans. Inform.
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